Even further east of Suez than Aden, the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, known locally as the Konfrontasi, was the most dangerous conflict in which Britain was directly involved under Douglas-Home. The confrontation originated from the British decision to create a federation of her former colonies of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah. The resultant new state of Malaysia came into being in September 1963. It immediately attracted the attention of President Sukarno of Indonesia, and British and Malaysian troops stationed in Borneo soon found themselves repelling Indonesian border raids. Although the confrontation continued until 1966, it reached its peak during 1963-4, costing £250 million and involving 66,000 troops.
1
Sukarno was at the height of his power. Through his independence struggle with the Netherlands and recent success over West New Guinea, along with his adherence to the doctrine of 'new emerging forces' and his involvement with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), he had established his reputation as a strong anti-colonialist leader. Thus, in February 1963, he openly criticised Malaysia as 'a manifestation of neo-colonialism' and 'an encirclement of the Indonesian republic'.
2 Yet there were other motivations beyond anti-colonial zeal. One was simple envy and dislike of the prosperous Malays. However, a larger consideration was Indonesia's desire to acquire the territories of northern Borneo-Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei (the latter a sultanate that stood aside from the Malaysia project)-to accompany her existing possessions in the south of the island.
3 As Britain's superiority of forces in the region ensured that direct conflict was a non-starter, Sukarno instead sponsored an uprising in northern Borneo, while simultaneously attempting to extract diplomatic concessions.
Having ruled out any such concessions, Britain was in an uncomfortable, defensive diplomatic position. 4 The 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) meant that Britain was already responsible for the defence of Malaya against external aggression. Australia and New Zealand, both Commonwealth countries with close ties to Britain, also became associated with the pact in 1959 and the Malays unexpectedly agreed to extend the agreement to the new federation without renegotiation. 5 The commitment to Malaysian defence was a serious one, given her encirclement by hostile countries. To the north (though beyond friendly Thailand), war raged in Vietnam, while to the west there was the Philippines, which had its own claims on Sabah. Indonesia lay to the east and south. Historians are divided as to why Britain took on such a potentially onerous commitment. Chin Kin Wah has argued that the creation of a strong, stable federation was intended as a precursor to disengagementa process delayed by the confrontation. 7 He is in the minority, however. John Darwin points to Britain's economic and defence ties with Malaysia and argues that it was rather a device to perpetuate influence.
8 Matthew Jones also sees some validity in Indonesian arguments that Malaysia was a way to maintain British influence, and John Subritzky comes down on this side too.
9 Philip Darby takes a position of synthesis. He dismisses the argument that the Malaysian federation was simply a device to relinquish control while retaining use of the bases in Singapore, as an over-simplification. Britain, he says, was also genuinely concerned for Borneo. He therefore contends that 'it is a naïve view which seeks to pin the confrontation simply on the fact of a British military presence '. 10 It is true that Britain had significant investments in the region. These were valued at up to £800 million during the confrontation and Britain depended on Malaya for rubber after the war.
11 However, the Foreign Office knew that it did not make economic sense to spend 15 per cent of the defence budget protecting a region that was economically less important to her than Latin America. Instead, it referred to the defence of Australia and New Zealand, combating communism and maintaining influence over the US as reasons to remain in the region.
12
The Cold War thus provided a more important reason. The weakness of some of the countries in the area, many of which were part of the NAM, left them vulnerable to the influence of both East and West. China was of particular concern, while the increasing tension between China and the USSR also threatened to destabilise the region.
13
This communist threat was particularly relevant to the case of former
